Internet-Draft | Mirror Binding | May 2023 |
Chen, et al. | Expires 11 November 2023 | [Page] |
BGP is used to distribute a binding to a node. The binding includes a binding SID and a path represented by a list of SIDs. This document describes extensions to BGP for distributing the information about the binding to a protecting node. For an SR path via the node with the binding SID, when the node fails, the protecting node such as the upstream neighbor on the path uses the information to protect the binding SID of the failed node.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [[RFC2119]] [[RFC8174]] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
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[I-D.ietf-idr-segment-routing-te-policy] specifies how BGP may be used to distribute a Segment Routing (SR) Policy to a node in a network. An SR Policy may contain a binding, which includes a binding SID and a path represented by a list of SIDs.¶
After a BGP as a controller distributes the binding to the node, the node forwards the packet with the binding SID according to the first SID in the list. It replaces the binding SID in the packet with the list of SIDs and forwards the packet using the FIB entry for the top SID (i.e., the first SID) in the packet.¶
When the node fails, suppose that a protecting node (e.g., the upstream neighbor as PLR) of the node has the corresponding binding protection information for protecting the binding SID of the node. The information includes the binding SID, the list of SIDs and an identifier of the node. After the upstream neighbor as PLR detects the failure of the node, for a packet with the node SID of the failed node received, it protects the binding SID of the failed node. It replaces the binding SID in the packet with the list of SIDs, forwards the packet without going through the failed node towards the top SID (i.e., the first SID, assuming it is a node SID for simplicity here). The requirement for distributing the binding protection information to a protecting node and how a protecting node protect the binding SID of the failed node are out of scope of this document and described in [I-D.ietf-spring-segment-protection-sr-te-paths] and [I-D.hu-spring-segment-routing-proxy-forwarding]. (Note: the second reference will be removed after the first one includes enough text for protecting binding SIDs of a node).¶
This document specifies some procedures and extensions to BGP for distributing the information to a protecting node that may protect the failed node.¶
This section defines a new Binding Protection sub-TLV under a Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute TLV of type 15 (i.e., SR Policy TLV). A Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute contains a Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute TLV. The structure containing a Binding Protection sub-TLV is shown below.¶
Attributes: Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute (23) Tunnel Type (15): SR Policy TLV Preference sub-TLV Binding SID sub-TLV SRv6 Binding SID sub-TLV Explicit NULL Label Policy (ENLP) sub-TLV Priority sub-TLV Policy Candidate Path Name sub-TLV Policy Name sub-TLV Binding Protection sub-TLV Segment List sub-TLV Weight sub-TLV Segment sub-TLV Segment sub-TLV ... ...¶
The format of a Binding Protection sub-TLV is illustrated below.¶
This field contains the sub-TLV below to indicate the node to be protected (i.e., the protected node).¶
When an SR Policy (i.e., SR Policy TLV) contains a binding SID and a path with a protected node, the SR policy is for distributing the binding protection information. The binding SID is encoded by a Binding SID sub-TLV or SRv6 Binding SID sub-TLV, the path is encoded by a Segment List Sub-TLV, and the node is encoded by a Binding Protection sub-TLV.¶
When an SR Policy contains a binding SID and a path without a protected node, the SR policy is for replacing the Binding SID with the path (i.e., the list of SIDs) when the node receives a packet with the Binding SID.¶
The format of Protected Node ID sub-TLV is illustrated below.¶
When a BGP sends a binding to node N for a SR path going through node N, the BGP distributes the corresponding binding protection information to the possible protecting nodes. The upstream neighbor of node N along the SR path is a protecting node. If node N is a loose hop in the SR path with N's node ID, the upstream node having its node SID next to N's node ID in the SR path and the neighbors of node N are the possible protecting nodes.¶
After sending the binding to node N and distributing the corresponding binding protection information to the protecting nodes, if BGP removes the binding from node N, it removes the corresponding binding protection information from the protecting nodes. If BGP changes the binding in node N, it changes the corresponding binding protection information in the protecting nodes.¶
Protocol extensions defined in this document do not affect the BGP security other than those as discussed in the Security Considerations section of [RFC9012].¶
This document requests assigning a new sub-TLV in the registry "BGP Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute sub-TLVs" as follows:¶
+------------+--------------------+-------------+ | Code Point | Description | Reference | +------------+--------------------+-------------+ | TBD1 | Binding Protection |This document| +------------+--------------------+-------------+¶
The authors would like to thank Andrew Stone, Robert Raszuk, Ketan Talaulikar, Donald Eastlake, Zhibo Hu, Haibo Wang, Yao Liu, Changwang Lin, Jie Dong and Zhenqiang Li for their comments to this work.¶