Internet Engineering Task Force B. Decraene, Ed. Internet-Draft Orange Updates: 6790, 7447 (if approved) J. G. Scudder, Ed. Intended status: Standards Track Juniper Networks Expires: 24 March 2024 W. Henderickx Nokia K. Kompella Juniper Networks S. Mohanty Cisco Systems J. Uttaro Independent Contributor B. Wen Comcast 21 September 2023 BGP Next-Hop Dependent Capabilities Attribute draft-ietf-idr-entropy-label-11 Abstract RFC 5492 allows a BGP speaker to advertise its capabilities to its peer. When a route is propagated beyond the immediate peer, it is useful to allow certain capabilities to be conveyed further. In particular, it is useful to advertise forwarding plane features. This specification defines a BGP transitive attribute to carry such capability information, the "Next-Hop Dependent Capabilities Attribute," or NHC. Unlike the capabilities defined by RFC 5492, those conveyed in the NHC apply solely to the routes advertised by the BGP UPDATE that contains the particular NHC. This specification also defines an NHC capability that can be used to advertise the ability to process the MPLS Entropy Label as an egress LSR for all NLRI advertised in the BGP UPDATE. It updates RFC 6790 and RFC 7447 concerning this BGP signaling. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Decraene, et al. Expires 24 March 2024 [Page 1] Internet-Draft NHC September 2023 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 24 March 2024. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. BGP Next-Hop Dependent Capabilities Attribute . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. Sending the NHC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.3. Receiving the NHC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.4. Attribute Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.5. Network Operation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3. Entropy Label Capability (ELCv3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.1. Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.2. Sending the ELCv3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.3. Receiving the ELCv3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.4. ELCv3 Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4. Legacy ELC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 6.1. Considerations for the NHC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 6.2. Considerations for the ELCv3 Capability . . . . . . . . . 13 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Appendix A. Other Means of Signaling EL Capability . . . . . . . 15 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Decraene, et al. Expires 24 March 2024 [Page 2] Internet-Draft NHC September 2023 1. Introduction [RFC5492] allows a Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) speaker to advertise its capabilities to its peer. When a route is propagated beyond the immediate peer, it is useful to allow certain capabilities to be conveyed further. In particular, it may be useful to advertise forwarding plane features. This specification defines a BGP optional transitive attribute to carry such capability information, the "Next-Hop Dependent Capabilities Attribute", or NHC. (Note that this specification should not be confused with RFC 5492 BGP Capabilities.) Since the NHC is intended chiefly for conveying information about forwarding plane features, it needs to be regenerated whenever the BGP route's next hop is changed. Since owing to the properties of BGP transitive attributes this can't be guaranteed (an intermediate router that doesn't implement this specification would be expected to propagate the NHC as opaque data), the NHC encodes the next hop of its originator, or the router that most recently updated the attribute. If the NHC passes through a router that changes the next hop without regenerating the NHC, they will fail to match when later examined, and the recipient can act accordingly. This scheme allows NHC support to be introduced into a network incrementally. Informally, the intent is that, * If a router is not changing the next hop, it can obliviously propagate the NHC just like any other optional transitive attribute. * If a router is changing the next hop, then it has to be able to vouch for every capability it includes in the NHC. Complete details are provided in Section 2. An NHC carried in a given BGP UPDATE message conveys information that relates to all Network Layer Reachability Information (NLRI) advertised in that particular UPDATE, and only to those NLRI. A different UPDATE message originated by the same source might not include an NHC, and if so, NLRI carried in that UPDATE would not be affected by the NHC. By implication, if a router wishes to use NHC to describe all NLRI it originates, it needs to include an NHC with each UPDATE it sends. In this respect, despite its similar naming, the NHC is unlike RFC 5492 BGP Capabilities. Decraene, et al. Expires 24 March 2024 [Page 3] Internet-Draft NHC September 2023 Informally, a capability included in a given NHC should not be thought of as a capability of the next hop, but rather a capability of the path, that depends on the ability of the next hop to support it. Hence it is said to be "dependent on" the next hop. This specification also defines an NHC capability, called "ELCv3", to advertise the ability to process the Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) Entropy Label as an egress Label Switching Router (LSR) for all NLRI advertised in the BGP UPDATE. It updates [RFC6790] and [RFC7447] with regard to this BGP signaling, this is further discussed in Section 3. Although ELCv3 is only relevant to labeled NLRI, a future NHC capability might be applicable to non-labeled NLRI, or to both, irrespective of labels. 1.1. Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 2. BGP Next-Hop Dependent Capabilities Attribute 2.1. Encoding The BGP Next-Hop Dependent Capabilities attribute (NHC attribute, or just NHC) is an optional, transitive BGP path attribute with type code 39. The NHC always includes a network layer address identifying the next hop of the route the NHC accompanies. The NHC signals potentially useful information, so it is desirable to make it transitive; the next hop data is to ensure correctness if it traverses BGP speakers that do not understand the NHC. This is further explained below. The Attribute Data field of the NHC attribute is encoded as a header portion that identifies the router that created or most recently updated the attribute, followed by one or more capability Type- Length-Value (TLV) triples: Decraene, et al. Expires 24 March 2024 [Page 4] Internet-Draft NHC September 2023 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Address Family Identifier | SAFI | Next Hop Len | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ~ Network Address of Next Hop (variable) ~ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ~ Capability TLVs (variable) ~ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Figure 1: NHC Format The meanings of the header fields (Address Family Identifier, SAFI or Subsequent Address Family Identifier, Length of Next Hop, and Network Address of Next Hop) are as given in Section 3 of [RFC4760]. In turn, each Capability is a TLV: 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Capability Code | Capability Length | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ~ Capability Value (variable) ~ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Figure 2: Capability TLV Format Capability Code: a two-octet unsigned binary integer that indicates the type of capability advertised and unambiguously identifies an individual capability. Capability Length: a two-octet unsigned binary integer that indicates the length, in octets, of the Capability Value field. A length of 0 indicates that the Capability Value field is zero-length, i.e. it has a null value. Capability Value: a variable-length field. It is interpreted according to the value of the Capability Code. A BGP speaker MUST NOT include more than one instance of a capability with the same Capability Code, Capability Length, and Capability Value. Note, however, that processing multiple instances of such a capability does not require special handling, as additional instances do not change the meaning of the announced capability; thus, a BGP speaker MUST be prepared to accept such multiple instances. Decraene, et al. Expires 24 March 2024 [Page 5] Internet-Draft NHC September 2023 BGP speakers MAY include more than one instance of a capability (as identified by the Capability Code) with different Capability Value. Processing of these capability instances is specific to the Capability Code and MUST be described in the document introducing the new capability. Capability TLVs MUST be placed in the NHC in increasing order of Capability Code. (In the event of multiple instances of a capability with the same Capability Code as discussed above, no further sorting order is defined here.) Although the major sorting order is mandated, an implementation MUST elect to be prepared to consume capabilities in any order, for robustness reasons. 2.2. Sending the NHC Suppose a BGP speaker S has a route R it wishes to advertise with next hop N to its peer. If S is originating R into BGP, it MAY include an NHC attribute with it, that carries capability TLVs that describe aspects of R. S MUST set the next hop depicted in the header portion of the NHC to be equal to N, using the encoding given above. If S has received R from some other BGP speaker, two possibilities exist. First, S could be propagating R without changing N. In that case, S need take no special action, it SHOULD simply propagate the NHC unchanged unless specifically configured otherwise. Indeed, we observe that this is no different from the default action a BGP speaker takes with an unrecognized optional transitive attribute -- it is treated as opaque data and propagated. Second, S could be changing R in some way, and in particular, it could be changing N. If S has changed N it MUST NOT propagate the NHC unchanged. It SHOULD include a newly-constructed NHC attribute with R, constructed as described above in the "originating R into BGP" case. Any given capability TLV carried by the newly-constructed NHC attribute might use information from the received NHC attribute as input to its construction, possibly as straightforwardly as simply copying the TLV. The details of how the capabilities in the new NHC are constructed are specific to the definition of each capability. Any capability TLVs received by S that are for capabilities not supported by S will not be included in the version of R constructed by S. Decraene, et al. Expires 24 March 2024 [Page 6] Internet-Draft NHC September 2023 An implementation SHOULD send the NHC and its contained capabilities by default. An implementation SHOULD provide configuration control of whether any given capability is sent. An implementation MAY provide finer-grained control on propagation based on attributes of the peering session, as discussed in Section 6.1. Due to the nature of BGP optional transitive path attributes, any BGP speaker that does not implement this specification will propagate the NHC, the requirements of this section notwithstanding. Such a speaker will not update the NHC, however. 2.3. Receiving the NHC An implementation SHOULD accept the NHC and its contained capabilities by default. An implementation SHOULD provide configuration control of whether any given capability is accepted. An implementation MAY provide finer-grained control on propagation based on attributes of the peering session, as discussed in Section 6.1. When a BGP speaker receives a BGP route that includes the NHC, it MUST compare the address given in the header portion of the NHC and illustrated in Figure 1 to the next hop of the BGP route. If the two match, the NHC may be further processed. If the two do not match, it means some intermediate BGP speaker that handled the route in transit both does not support NHC, and changed the next hop of the route. In this case, the contents of the NHC cannot be used, and the NHC MUST be discarded without further processing, except that the contents MAY be logged. In considering whether the next hop "matches", a semantic match is sought. While bit-for-bit equality is a trivial test of matching, there may be certain cases where the two are not bit-for-bit equal, but still "match". An example is when an MP_REACH Next Hop encodes both a global and a link-local IPv6 address. In that case, the link- local address might be removed during Internal BGP (IBGP) propagation, the two would still be considered to match if they were equal on the global part. See Section 3 of [RFC2545]. A BGP speaker receiving a Capability Code that it supports behaves as defined in the document defining the Capability Code. A BGP speaker receiving a Capability Code that it does not support MUST ignore that Capability Code. In particular, the receipt of an unrecognized Capability Code MUST NOT be handled as an error. The presence of a capability SHOULD NOT influence route selection or route preference, unless tunneling is used to reach the BGP next hop, the selected route has been learned from External BGP (that is, the Decraene, et al. Expires 24 March 2024 [Page 7] Internet-Draft NHC September 2023 next hop is in a different Autonomous System), or by configuration (see following). Indeed, it is in general impossible for a node to know that all BGP routers of the Autonomous System (AS) will understand a given capability, and if different routers within an AS were to use a different preference for a route, forwarding loops could result unless tunneling is used to reach the BGP next hop. Following this reasoning, if the administrator of the network is confident that all routers within the AS will interpret the presence of the capability in the same way, they could relax this restriction by configuration. 2.4. Attribute Error Handling An NHC is considered malformed if the length of the attribute, encoded in the Attribute Length field of the BGP Path Attribute header (Section 4.3 of [RFC4271]), is inconsistent with the lengths of the contained capability TLVs. In other words, the sum of the sizes (Capability Length plus 4) of the contained capability TLVs, plus the length of the NHC header (Figure 1), must be equal to the overall Attribute Length. A BGP UPDATE message with a malformed NHC SHALL be handled using the approach of "attribute discard" defined in [RFC7606]. Unknown Capability Codes MUST NOT be considered to be an error. An NHC that contains no capability TLVs MAY be considered malformed, although it is observed that the prescribed behavior of "attribute discard" is semantically no different from that of having no TLVs to process. A document that specifies a new NHC Capability should provide specifics regarding what constitutes an error for that NHC Capability. If a capability TLV is malformed, that capability TLV SHOULD be ignored and removed. Other capability TLVs SHOULD be processed as usual. If a given capability TLV requires different error-handling treatment than described in the previous sentences, its specification should provide specifics. Decraene, et al. Expires 24 March 2024 [Page 8] Internet-Draft NHC September 2023 2.5. Network Operation Considerations In the corner case where multiple nodes use the same IP address as their BGP next hop, such as with anycast nodes as described in [RFC4786], a BGP speaker MUST NOT advertise a given capability unless all nodes sharing this same IP address support this capability. The network operator operating those anycast nodes is responsible for ensuring that an anycast node does not advertise a capability not supported by all nodes sharing this anycast address. The means for accomplishing this are beyond the scope of this document. 3. Entropy Label Capability (ELCv3) The foregoing sections define the NHC as a container for capability TLVs. The Entropy Label Capability is one such capability. When BGP [RFC4271] is used for distributing labeled NLRI as described in, for example, [RFC8277], the route may include the ELCv3 as part of the NHC. The inclusion of this capability with a route indicates that the egress of the associated Label Switched Path (LSP) can process entropy labels as an egress LSR for that route -- see Section 4.1 of [RFC6790]. Below, we refer to this for brevity as being "EL-capable." For historical reasons, this capability is referred to as "ELCv3", to distinguish it from the prior Entropy Label Capability (ELC) defined in [RFC6790] and deprecated in [RFC7447], and the ELCv2 described in [I-D.scudder-bgp-entropy-label]. This section (and its subsections) replaces Section 5.2 of [RFC6790], which was previously deprecated by [RFC7447]. 3.1. Encoding The ELCv3 has capability code 1, capability length 0, and carries no value: 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Capability Code = 1 | Capability Length = 0 | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Figure 3: ELCv3 TLV Format Decraene, et al. Expires 24 March 2024 [Page 9] Internet-Draft NHC September 2023 3.2. Sending the ELCv3 When a BGP speaker S has a route R it wishes to advertise with next hop N to its peer, it SHOULD include the ELCv3 capability if it knows that the egress of the associated LSP L is EL-capable, otherwise it MUST NOT include the ELCv3 capability. Specific conditions where S would know that the egress is EL-capable are if S: * Is itself the egress, and knows itself to be EL-capable, or * Is re-advertising a BGP route it received with a valid ELCv3 capability, and is not changing the value of N, or * Is re-advertising a BGP route it received with a valid ELCv3 capability, and is changing the value of N, and knows (for example, through configuration) that the router represented by N is either the LSP egress and is EL-capable, or that it will simply swap labels without popping the BGP-advertised label stack and processing the label below, as with a transit LSR, or * Is redistributing a route learned from another protocol, and that other protocol conveyed the knowledge that the egress of L was EL- capable. (For example, this might be known through the Label Distribution Protocol (LDP) ELC TLV, Section 5.1 of [RFC6790].) The ELCv3 MAY be advertised with routes that are labeled, such as those using SAFI 4 [RFC8277]. It MUST NOT be advertised with unlabeled routes. 3.3. Receiving the ELCv3 (Below, we assume that "includes the ELCv3" implies that the containing NHC has passed the checks specified in Section 2.3. If it had not passed, then the NHC would have been discarded and the ELCv3 would be deemed not to have been included.) When a BGP speaker receives an unlabeled route that includes the ELCv3, it MUST discard the ELCv3. When a BGP speaker receives a labeled route that includes the ELCv3, it indicates the associated LSP supports entropy labels. This implies that the receiving BGP speaker if acting as ingress, MAY insert an entropy label as per Section 4.2 of [RFC6790]. 3.4. ELCv3 Error Handling The ELCv3 is considered malformed and must be disregarded if its length is other than zero. Decraene, et al. Expires 24 March 2024 [Page 10] Internet-Draft NHC September 2023 4. Legacy ELC The ELCv3 functionality introduced in this document replaces the "BGP Entropy Label Capability Attribute" (ELC attribute) that was introduced by [RFC6790], and deprecated by [RFC7447]. The latter RFC specifies that the ELC attribute, BGP path attribute 28, "MUST be treated as any other unrecognized optional, transitive attribute". This specification revises that requirement. As the current specification was developed, it became clear that due to incompatibilities between how the ELC attribute is processed by different fielded implementations, the most prudent handling of attribute 28 is not to propagate it as an unrecognized optional, transitive attribute, but to discard it. Therefore, this specification updates [RFC7447], by instead requiring that an implementation that receives the ELC attribute MUST discard any received ELC attribute. 5. IANA Considerations IANA has made a temporary allocation in the BGP Path Attributes registry of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Parameters group. IANA is requested to make this allocation permanent. +=======+===========================================+============+ | Value | Code | Reference | +=======+===========================================+============+ | 39 | BGP Next-Hop Dependent Capabilities (NHC) | (this doc) | +-------+-------------------------------------------+------------+ Table 1 IANA is requested to create a new registry called "BGP Next-Hop Dependent Capability Codes" within the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Parameters group. The registry's allocation policy is First Come, First Served, except where designated otherwise in Table 2. It is seeded with the following values: Decraene, et al. Expires 24 March 2024 [Page 11] Internet-Draft NHC September 2023 +===============+==================+============+===================+ | Value | Description | Reference | Change Controller | +===============+==================+============+===================+ | 0 | reserved | (this doc) | IETF | +---------------+------------------+------------+-------------------+ | 1 | ELCv3 | (this doc) | IETF | +---------------+------------------+------------+-------------------+ | 65400 - | private use | (this doc) | IETF | | 65499 | | | | +---------------+------------------+------------+-------------------+ | 65500 - | reserved for | (this doc) | IETF | | 65534 | experimental use | | | +---------------+------------------+------------+-------------------+ | 65535 | reserved | (this doc) | IETF | +---------------+------------------+------------+-------------------+ Table 2 6. Security Considerations 6.1. Considerations for the NHC The header portion of the NHC contains the next hop the attribute's originator included when sending it, or that an intermediate router included when updating the attribute (in the latter case, the "contract" with the intermediate router is that it performed the checks in Section 2.3 before propagating the attribute). This will typically be an IP address of the router in question. This may be an infrastructure address the network operator does not intend to announce beyond the border of its Autonomous System, and it may even be considered in some weak sense, confidential information. A motivating application for this attribute is to convey information between Autonomous Systems that are under the control of the same administrator. In such a case, it would not need to be sent to other Autonomous Systems. At time of writing, work [I-D.uttaro-idr-bgp-oad] is underway to standardize a method of distinguishing between the two categories of external Autonomous Systems, and if such a distinction is available, an implementation can take advantage of it by constraining the NHC and its contained capabilities to only propagate by default to and from the former category of Autonomous Systems. If such a distinction is not available, a network operator may prefer to configure routers peering with Autonomous Systems not under their administrative control to not send or accept the NHC or its contained capabilities, unless there is an identified need to do so. Decraene, et al. Expires 24 March 2024 [Page 12] Internet-Draft NHC September 2023 The foregoing notwithstanding, control of NHC propagation can't be guaranteed in all cases -- if a border router doesn't implement this specification, the attribute, like all BGP optional transitive attributes, will propagate to neighboring Autonomous Systems. (This can be seen as a specific case of the general "attribute escape" phenomenon discussed in [I-D.haas-idr-bgp-attribute-escape].) Similarly, if a border router receiving the attribute from an external Autonomous System doesn't implement this specification, it will store and propagate the attribute, the requirements of Section 2.3 notwithstanding. So, sometimes this information could leak beyond its intended scope. (Note that it will only propagate as far as the first router that does support this specification, at which point it will typically be discarded due to a non-matching next hop, per Section 2.3.) If the attribute leaks beyond its intended scope, capabilities within it would potentially be exposed. Specifications for individual capabilities should consider the consequences of such unintended exposure, and should identify any necessary constraints on propagation. 6.2. Considerations for the ELCv3 Capability Insertion of an ELCv3 by an attacker could cause forwarding to fail. Deletion of an ELCv3 by an attacker could cause one path in the network to be overutilized and another to be underutilized. However, we note that an attacker able to accomplish either of these (below, an "on-path attacker") could equally insert or remove any other BGP path attribute or message. The former attack described above denies service for a given route, which can be accomplished by an on-path attacker in any number of ways even absent ELCv3. The latter attack defeats an optimization but nothing more; it seems dubious that an attacker would go to the trouble of doing so rather than launching some more damaging attack. 7. References 7.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC2545] Marques, P. and F. Dupont, "Use of BGP-4 Multiprotocol Extensions for IPv6 Inter-Domain Routing", RFC 2545, DOI 10.17487/RFC2545, March 1999, . Decraene, et al. Expires 24 March 2024 [Page 13] Internet-Draft NHC September 2023 [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, . [RFC4760] Bates, T., Chandra, R., Katz, D., and Y. Rekhter, "Multiprotocol Extensions for BGP-4", RFC 4760, DOI 10.17487/RFC4760, January 2007, . [RFC6790] Kompella, K., Drake, J., Amante, S., Henderickx, W., and L. Yong, "The Use of Entropy Labels in MPLS Forwarding", RFC 6790, DOI 10.17487/RFC6790, November 2012, . [RFC7447] Scudder, J. and K. Kompella, "Deprecation of BGP Entropy Label Capability Attribute", RFC 7447, DOI 10.17487/RFC7447, February 2015, . [RFC7606] Chen, E., Ed., Scudder, J., Ed., Mohapatra, P., and K. Patel, "Revised Error Handling for BGP UPDATE Messages", RFC 7606, DOI 10.17487/RFC7606, August 2015, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . 7.2. Informative References [I-D.haas-idr-bgp-attribute-escape] Haas, J., "BGP Attribute Escape", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-haas-idr-bgp-attribute-escape-00, 9 July 2023, . [I-D.ietf-idr-next-hop-capability] Decraene, B., Kompella, K., and W. Henderickx, "BGP Next- Hop dependent capabilities", Work in Progress, Internet- Draft, draft-ietf-idr-next-hop-capability-08, 8 June 2022, . Decraene, et al. Expires 24 March 2024 [Page 14] Internet-Draft NHC September 2023 [I-D.scudder-bgp-entropy-label] Scudder, J. and K. Kompella, "BGP Entropy Label Capability, Version 2", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-scudder-bgp-entropy-label-00, 28 April 2022, . [I-D.uttaro-idr-bgp-oad] Uttaro, J., Retana, A., Mohapatra, P., Patel, K., and B. Wen, "One Administrative Domain using BGP", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-uttaro-idr-bgp-oad-02, 10 July 2023, . [RFC4786] Abley, J. and K. Lindqvist, "Operation of Anycast Services", BCP 126, RFC 4786, DOI 10.17487/RFC4786, December 2006, . [RFC5492] Scudder, J. and R. Chandra, "Capabilities Advertisement with BGP-4", RFC 5492, DOI 10.17487/RFC5492, February 2009, . [RFC8277] Rosen, E., "Using BGP to Bind MPLS Labels to Address Prefixes", RFC 8277, DOI 10.17487/RFC8277, October 2017, . Appendix A. Other Means of Signaling EL Capability A router that supports this specification could also have other means to know that an egress is EL-capable, for example, it could support ELCv2 [I-D.scudder-bgp-entropy-label], or it could know through configuration. If a router learns through any means that an egress is EL-capable, it MAY treat the egress as EL-capable. For example, reception of a valid ELCv2 would be sufficient (even if a valid ELCv3 is not received), and similarly, reception of a valid ELCv3 would be sufficient (even if a valid ELCv2 is not received). The details of which methods are accepted for signaling EL capability are beyond the scope of this specification but SHOULD be configurable by the user. Acknowledgements The authors of this specification thank Randy Bush, Wes Hardaker, Susan Hares, and Gyan Mishra for their review and comments. This specification derives from two earlier documents, [I-D.ietf-idr-next-hop-capability] and [I-D.scudder-bgp-entropy-label]. Decraene, et al. Expires 24 March 2024 [Page 15] Internet-Draft NHC September 2023 [I-D.ietf-idr-next-hop-capability] included the following acknowledgements: The Entropy Label Next-Hop Capability defined in this document is based on the ELC BGP attribute defined in section 5.2 of [RFC6790]. The authors wish to thank John Scudder for the discussions on this topic and Eric Rosen for his in-depth review of this document. The authors wish to thank Jie Dong and Robert Raszuk for their review and comments. [I-D.scudder-bgp-entropy-label] included the following acknowledgements: Thanks to Swadesh Agrawal, Alia Atlas, Bruno Decraene, Martin Djernaes, John Drake, Adrian Farrell, Keyur Patel, Toby Rees, and Ravi Singh, for their discussion of this issue. Contributors Serge Krier Cisco Systems Email: sekrier@cisco.com Kevin Wang Juniper Networks Email: kfwang@juniper.net Authors' Addresses Bruno Decraene (editor) Orange Email: bruno.decraene@orange.com John G. Scudder (editor) Juniper Networks Email: jgs@juniper.net Wim Henderickx Nokia Email: wim.henderickx@nokia.com Decraene, et al. Expires 24 March 2024 [Page 16] Internet-Draft NHC September 2023 Kireeti Kompella Juniper Networks Email: kireeti@juniper.net Satya Mohanty Cisco Systems Email: satyamoh@cisco.com James Uttaro Independent Contributor Email: juttaro@ieee.org Bin Wen Comcast Email: Bin_Wen@comcast.com Decraene, et al. Expires 24 March 2024 [Page 17]