| Internet-Draft | Finding and Using Geofeed Data | September 2023 |
| Bush, et al. | Expires 23 March 2024 | [Page] |
This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy Specification Language inetnum: class to refer specifically to geofeed data files and describes an optional scheme that uses the Resource Public Key Infrastructure to authenticate the geofeed datafiles.¶
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Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
Providers of Internet content and other services may wish to customize those services based on the geographic location of the user of the service. This is often done using the source IP address used to contact the service, which may not point to a user, see [RFC6269], Section 14 in particular. Also, infrastructure and other services might wish to publish the locale of their services. [RFC8805] defines geofeed, a syntax to associate geographic locales with IP addresses, but it does not specify how to find the relevant geofeed data given an IP address.¶
This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL) [RFC2725] inetnum: class to refer specifically to geofeed data files and how to prudently use them. In all places inetnum: is used, inet6num: should also be assumed [RFC4012].¶
The reader may find [INETNUM] and [INET6NUM] informative, and certainly more verbose, descriptions of the inetnum: database classes.¶
An optional utterly awesome but slightly complex means for authenticating geofeed data is also defined in Section 5.¶
This document obsoletes [RFC9092]. Changes from [RFC9092] include the following:¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
Geofeed files are described in [RFC8805]. They provide a facility for an IP address resource "owner" to associate those IP addresses to geographic locales.¶
Per [RFC8805], geofeed files consist of CSVs (Comma Separated Values) in UTF-8 text format; not HTML, richtext, or other formats.¶
Content providers and other parties who wish to locate an IP address to a geographic locale need to find the relevant geofeed data. In Section 3, this document specifies how to find the relevant geofeed [RFC8805] file given an IP address.¶
Geofeed data for large providers with significant horizontal scale and high granularity can be quite large. The size of a file can be even larger if an unsigned geofeed file combines data for many prefixes, if dual IPv4/IPv6 spaces are represented, etc.¶
Geofeed data do have privacy considerations (see Section 7); this process makes bulk access to those data easier.¶
This document also suggests an optional signature to strongly authenticate the data in the geofeed files.¶
The original RPSL specifications starting with [RIPE81], [RIPE181], and a trail of subsequent documents were written by the RIPE community. The IETF standardized RPSL in [RFC2622] and [RFC4012]. Since then, it has been modified and extensively enhanced in the Regional Internet Registry (RIR) community, mostly by RIPE [RIPE-DB]. Currently, change control effectively lies in the operator community.¶
The RPSL, and [RFC2725] and [RFC4012] used by the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), specify the inetnum: database class. Each of these objects describes an IP address range and its attributes. The inetnum: objects form a hierarchy ordered on the address space.¶
Ideally, RPSL would be augmented to define a new RPSL geofeed: attribute in the inetnum: class. Absent implementation of the geofeed: attribute in a particular RIR database, this document defines the syntax of a Geofeed remarks: attribute, which contains an HTTPS URL of a geofeed file. The format of the inetnum: geofeed remarks: attribute MUST be as in this example, "remarks: Geofeed ", where the token "Geofeed " MUST be case sensitive, followed by a URL that will vary, but it MUST refer only to a single geofeed [RFC8805] file.¶
inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example
remarks: Geofeed https://example.com/geofeed
¶
While we leave global agreement of RPSL modification to the relevant parties, we specify that a proper geofeed: attribute in the inetnum: class MUST be "geofeed:" and MUST be followed by a single URL that will vary, but it MUST refer only to a single geofeed [RFC8805] file.¶
inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example
geofeed: https://example.com/geofeed
¶
The URL uses HTTPS, so the WebPKI provides authentication, integrity, and confidentiality for the fetched geofeed file. However, the WebPKI can not provide authentication of IP address space assignment. In contrast, the RPKI (see [RFC6481]) can be used to authenticate IP space assignment; see optional authentication in Section 5.¶
Until all producers of inetnum: objects, i.e., the RIRs, state that they have migrated to supporting a geofeed: attribute, consumers looking at inetnum: objects to find geofeed URLs MUST be able to consume both the remarks: and geofeed: forms.¶
The migration not only implies that the RIRs support the geofeed: attribute, but that all registrants have migrated any inetnum: objects from remarks: to geofeed: attributes.¶
Any particular inetnum: object SHOULD have, at most, one geofeed reference, whether a remarks: or a proper geofeed: attribute when it is implemented. If there is more than one, the geofeed: attribute SHOULD be used.¶
For inetnum:s covering the same address range, or an inetnum: with both remarks: and geofeed: attributes, a signed geofeed file SHOULD be preferred over an unsigned file.¶
If a geofeed file describes multiple disjoint ranges of IP address space, there are likely to be geofeed references from multiple inetnum: objects. Files with geofeed references from multiple inetnum: objects are not compatible with the signing procedure in Section 5.¶
An unsigned, and only an unsigned, geofeed file MAY be referenced by multiple inetnum:s and MAY contain prefixes from more than one registry.¶
When geofeed references are provided by multiple inetnum: objects that have identical address ranges, then the geofeed reference on the inetnum: with the most recent last-modified: attribute SHOULD be preferred.¶
As inetnum: objects form a hierarchy, geofeed references SHOULD be at the lowest applicable inetnum: object covering the relevant address ranges in the referenced geofeed file. When fetching, the most specific inetnum: object with a geofeed reference MUST be used.¶
It is significant that geofeed data may have finer granularity than the inetnum: that refers to them. For example, an INETNUM object for an address range P could refer to a geofeed file in which P has been subdivided into one or more longer prefixes.¶
This document is to provides a guideline for how interested parties should fetch and read geofeed files.¶
Historically, before geofeed files, this was done in varied ways, at the discretion of the implementer, often without consistent authentication, where data were mostly imported from email without formal authorisation or validation.¶
To minimize the load on RIRs' WHOIS [RFC3912] services, the RIR's FTP [RFC0959] services SHOULD be used for large-scale access to gather geofeed URLs. This uses efficient bulk access instead of fetching via brute-force search through the IP space.¶
When an inetnum: with a geofeed file reference is identified, the file MUST be downloaded using HTTPS.¶
When reading data from the geofeed file, one MUST ignore data outside the referring inetnum: object's address range. This is to avoid importing data about ranges not under the control of the operator. If geofeed files are fetched, other location information from the inetnum: MUST be ignored.¶
Given an address range of interest, the most specific inetnum: object with a geofeed reference MUST be used to fetch the geofeed file. For example, if the fetching party finds the following inetnum: objects:¶
inetnum: 192.0.2.0/12 # example
remarks: Geofeed https://example.com/geofeed_1
inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example
remarks: Geofeed https://example.com/geofeed_2
¶
and the file geofeed_1 contains geolocation data about 192.0.2.0/29, this MUST be discarded because 192.0.2.0/24 is within the more specific inetnum: covering the address range and that inetnum: has a geofeed reference.¶
If an inetnum: object has both remarks: with geofeed data and also has a geofeed: attribute, the geofeed: attribute SHOULD be used and the remarks: ignored.¶
Hints in inetnum:s such as country:, geoloc:, etc. tend to be administrative, and not deployment specific. Consider large, possibly global, providers with headquarters very far from most of their deployments. Therefore, if geofeed data are specified, either as a geofeed: attribute or in a geofeed remarks: attribute, other geographic hints such as country:, geoloc:, DNS geoloc RRsets, etc., for that address range MUST be ignored.¶
There is open-source code to traverse the RPSL data across all of the RIRs, collect all geofeed references, and process them [GEOFEED-FINDER]. It implements the steps above and of all the Operational Considerations described in Section 6, including caching. It produces a single geofeed file, merging all the geofeed files found. This open-source code can be run daily by a cronjob, and the output file can be directly used.¶
The question arises whether a particular geofeed [RFC8805] data set is valid, i.e., is authorized by the "owner" of the IP address space and is authoritative in some sense. The inetnum: that points to the geofeed [RFC8805] file provides some assurance. Unfortunately, the RPSL in some repositories is weakly authenticated at best. An approach where RPSL was signed per [RFC7909] would be good, except it would have to be deployed by all RPSL registries, and there is a fair number of them.¶
A single optional authenticator MAY be appended to a geofeed [RFC8805] file. It is a digest of the main body of the file signed by the private key of the relevant RPKI certificate for a covering address range. One needs a format that bundles the relevant RPKI certificate with the signature of the geofeed text.¶
The canonicalization procedure converts the data from their internal character representation to the UTF-8 [RFC3629] character encoding, and the <CRLF> sequence MUST be used to denote the end of a line of text. A blank line is represented solely by the <CRLF> sequence. For robustness, any non-printable characters MUST NOT be changed by canonicalization. Trailing blank lines MUST NOT appear at the end of the file. That is, the file must not end with multiple consecutive <CRLF> sequences. Any end-of-file marker used by an operating system is not considered to be part of the file content. When present, such end-of-file markers MUST NOT be processed by the digital signature algorithm.¶
Should the authenticator be syntactically incorrect per the above, the authenticator is invalid.¶
Borrowing detached signatures from [RFC5485], after file canonicalization, the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] would be used to create a detached DER-encoded signature that is then padded BASE64 encoded (as per Section 4 of [RFC4648]) and line wrapped to 72 or fewer characters. The same digest algorithm MUST be used for calculating the message digest on content being signed, which is the geofeed file, and for calculating the message digest on the SignerInfo SignedAttributes [RFC8933]. The message digest algorithm identifier MUST appear in both the SignedData DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers and the SignerInfo DigestAlgorithmIdentifier [RFC5652].¶
The address range of the signing certificate MUST cover all prefixes on the geofeed file it signs. The certificate MUST NOT include the Autonomous System Identifier Delegation certificate extension [RFC3779].¶
An address range A "covers" address range B if the range of B is identical to or a subset of A. "Address range" is used here because inetnum: objects and RPKI certificates need not align on Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) [RFC4632] prefix boundaries, while those of the lines in a geofeed file do.¶
As the signer specifies the covered RPKI resources relevant to the signature, the RPKI certificate covering the inetnum: object's address range is included in the [RFC5652] CMS SignedData certificates field.¶
The CA MUST sign only one Geofeed with each generated private key and MUST generate a new key pair for each new version of the Geofeed. An associated EE certificate used in this fashion is termed a "one-time-use" EE certificate (see Section 3 of [RFC6487]).¶
Identifying the private key associated with the certificate and getting the department that controls the private key (which might be trapped in a Hardware Security Module (HSM)) to sign the CMS blob is left as an exercise for the implementor. On the other hand, verifying the signature requires no complexity; the certificate, which can be validated in the public RPKI, has the needed public key. The trust anchors for the RIRs are expected to already be available to the party performing signature validation. Validation of the CMS signature on the geofeed file involves:¶
Obtaining the signer's certificate from the CMS SignedData CertificateSet [RFC5652]. The certificate SubjectKeyIdentifier extension [RFC5280] MUST match the SubjectKeyIdentifier in the CMS SignerInfo SignerIdentifier [RFC5652]. If the key identifiers do not match, then validation MUST fail.¶
Validation of the signer's certificate MUST ensure that it is part of the current [RFC6486] manifest and that the resources are covered by the RPKI certificate.¶
All of these steps MUST be successful to consider the geofeed file signature as valid.¶
As the signer specifies the covered RPKI resources relevant to the signature, the RPKI certificate covering the inetnum: object's address range is included in the CMS SignedData certificates field [RFC5652].¶
An IP Address Delegation extension using "inherit" would complicate processing. The implementation would have to build the certification path from the end-entity to the trust anchor, then validate the path from the trust anchor to the end-entity, and then the parameter would have to be remembered when the validated public key was used to validate a signature on a CMS object. Having to remember things from certification path validation for use with CMS object processing is too hard. And, the certificates do not get that much bigger by repeating the information.¶
Therefore an extension using "inherit" MUST NOT be used. This is consistent with other RPKI signed objects.¶
Identifying the private key associated with the certificate and getting the department with the Hardware Security Module (HSM) to sign the CMS blob is left as an exercise for the implementor. On the other hand, verifying the signature requires no complexity; the certificate, which can be validated in the public RPKI, has the needed public key.¶
The appendix MUST be hidden as a series of "#" comments at the end of the geofeed file. The following is a cryptographically incorrect, albeit simple, example. A correct and full example is in Appendix A.¶
# RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0 - 192.0.2.255
# MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ
# IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu
...
# imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa
# O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk=
# End Signature: 192.0.2.0 - 192.0.2.255
¶
The signature does not cover the signature lines.¶
The bracketing "# RPKI Signature:" and "# End Signature:" MUST be present following the model as shown. Their IP address range MUST match that of the inetnum: URL followed to the file.¶
[RFC9323] describes and provides code for a CMS profile for a general purpose listing of checksums (a "checklist") for use with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). It provides usable, albeit complex, code to sign geofeed files.¶
[RPKI-RTA] describes a CMS profile for a general purpose Resource Tagged Attestation (RTA) based on the RPKI. While this is expected to become applicable in the long run, for the purposes of this document, a self-signed root trust anchor is used.¶
To create the needed inetnum: objects, an operator wishing to register the location of their geofeed file needs to coordinate with their Regional Internet Registry (RIR) or National Internet Registry (NIR) and/or any provider Local Internet Registry (LIR) that has assigned address ranges to them. RIRs/NIRs provide means for assignees to create and maintain inetnum: objects. They also provide means of assigning or sub-assigning IP address resources and allowing the assignee to create WHOIS data, including inetnum: objects, thereby referring to geofeed files.¶
The geofeed files MUST be published via and fetched using HTTPS [RFC2818].¶
When using data from a geofeed file, one MUST ignore data outside the referring inetnum: object's inetnum: attribute address range.¶
If and only if the geofeed file is not signed per Section 5, then multiple inetnum: objects MAY refer to the same geofeed file, and the consumer MUST use only lines in the geofeed file where the prefix is covered by the address range of the inetnum: object's URL it has followed.¶
If the geofeed file is signed, and the signer's certificate changes, the signature in the geofeed file MUST be updated.¶
It is good key hygiene to use a given key for only one purpose. To dedicate a signing private key for signing a geofeed file, an RPKI Certification Authority (CA) may issue a subordinate certificate exclusively for the purpose shown in Appendix A.¶
Harvesting and publishing aggregated geofeed data outside of the RPSL model should be avoided as it can have the effect that more specifics from one aggregatee could undesirably affect the less specifics of a different aggregatee. The validation model in Section Section 5 handles this issue within the RPSL model.¶
Currently, geolocation providers have bulk WHOIS data access at all the RIRs. An anonymized version of such data is openly available for all RIRs except ARIN, which requires an authorization. However, for users without such authorization, the same result can be achieved with extra RDAP effort. There is open-source code to pass over such data across all RIRs, collect all geofeed references, and process them [GEOFEED-FINDER].¶
To prevent undue load on RPSL and geofeed servers, entity-fetching geofeed data using these mechanisms MUST NOT do frequent real-time lookups. Section 3.4 of [RFC8805] suggests use of the HTTP Expires header [RFC7234] to signal when geofeed data should be refetched. As the data change very infrequently, in the absence of such an HTTP Header signal, collectors SHOULD NOT fetch more frequently than weekly. It would be polite not to fetch at magic times such as midnight UTC, the first of the month, etc., because too many others are likely to do the same.¶
[RFC8805] geofeed data may reveal the approximate location of an IP address, which might in turn reveal the approximate location of an individual user. Unfortunately, [RFC8805] provides no privacy guidance on avoiding or ameliorating possible damage due to this exposure of the user. In publishing pointers to geofeed files as described in this document, the operator should be aware of this exposure in geofeed data and be cautious. All the privacy considerations of Section 4 of [RFC8805] apply to this document.¶
Where [RFC8805] provided the ability to publish location data, this document makes bulk access to those data readily available. This is a goal, not an accident.¶
Currently, the geofeed: attribute in inetnum objects has been implemented in the RIPE and APNIC databases.¶
Registrants in databases which do not yet support the geofeed: attribute are using the remarks:, or equivalent, attribute.¶
Currently, the registry data published by ARIN are not the same RPSL as that of the other registries (see [RFC7485] for a survey of the WHOIS Tower of Babel); therefore, when fetching from ARIN via FTP [RFC0959], WHOIS [RFC3912], the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) [RFC9082], etc., the "NetRange" attribute/key must be treated as "inetnum", and the "Comment" attribute must be treated as "remarks".¶
[rpki-client] can be used to authenticate a signed geofeed file.¶
It is generally prudent for a consumer of geofeed data to also use other sources to cross-validate the data. All the security considerations of [RFC8805] apply here as well.¶
The consumer of geofeed data SHOULD fetch and process the data themselves. Importing datasets produced and/or processed by a third-party places ill-advised trust in the third-party.¶
As mentioned in Section 5, some RPSL repositories have weak, if any, authentication. This allows spoofing of inetnum: objects pointing to malicious geofeed files. Section 5 suggests an unfortunately complex method for stronger authentication based on the RPKI.¶
For example, if an inetnum: for a wide address range (e.g., a /16) points to an RPKI-signed geofeed file, a customer or attacker could publish an unsigned equal or narrower (e.g., a /24) inetnum: in a WHOIS registry that has weak authorization, abusing the rule that the most-specific inetnum: object with a geofeed reference MUST be used.¶
If signatures were mandatory, the above attack would be stymied, but of course that is not happening anytime soon.¶
The RPSL providers have had to throttle fetching from their servers due to too-frequent queries. Usually, they throttle by the querying IP address or block. Similar defenses will likely need to be deployed by geofeed file servers.¶
There are no new actions needed by the IANA.¶
Thanks to Rob Austein for CMS and detached signature clue, George Michaelson for the first and substantial external review, and Erik Kline who was too shy to agree to coauthorship. Additionally, we express our gratitude to early implementors, including Menno Schepers; Flavio Luciani; Eric Dugas; and Kevin Pack. Also, thanks to the following geolocation providers who are consuming geofeeds with this described solution: Jonathan Kosgei (ipdata.co), Ben Dowling (ipinfo.io), and Pol Nisenblat (bigdatacloud.com). For an amazing number of helpful reviews, we thank Job Snijders, who also found an ASN.1 'inherit' issue; Adrian Farrel; Antonio Prado; Francesca Palombini; Jean-Michel Combes (INTDIR); John Scudder; Kyle Rose (SECDIR); Martin Duke; Murray Kucherawy; Paul Kyzivat (GENART); Rob Wilton; Roman Danyliw; and Ties de Kock.¶
This appendix provides an example, including a trust anchor, a CRL signed by the trust anchor, a CA certificate subordinate to the trust anchor, a CRL signed by the CA, an end-entity certificate subordinate to the CA for signing the geofeed, and a detached signature.¶
The trust anchor is represented by a self-signed certificate. As usual in the RPKI, the trust anchor has authority over all IPv4 address blocks, all IPv6 address blocks, and all AS numbers.¶
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIEPjCCAyagAwIBAgIUPsUFJ4e/7pKZ6E14aBdkbYzms1gwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMDA5MDMxODU0NTRaFw0zMDA5 MDExODU0NTRaMBUxEzARBgNVBAMTCmV4YW1wbGUtdGEwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB AQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCelMmMDCGBhqn/a3VrNAoKMr1HVLKxGoG7VF/13HZJ 0twObUZlh3Jz+XeD+kNAURhELWTrsgdTkQQfqinqOuRemxTl55+x7nLpe5nmwaBH XqqDOHubmkbAGanGcm6T/rD9KNk1Z46Uc2p7UYu0fwNO0mo0aqFL2FSyvzZwziNe g7ELYZ4a3LvGn81JfP/JvM6pgtoMNuee5RV6TWaz7LV304ICj8Bhphy/HFpOA1rb O9gs8CUMgqz+RroAIa8cV8gbF/fPCz9Ofl7Gdmib679JxxFrW4wRJ0nMJgJmsZXq jaVc0g7ORc+eIAcHw7Uroc6h7Y7lGjOkDZF75j0mLQa3AgMBAAGjggGEMIIBgDAd BgNVHQ4EFgQU3hNEuwvUGNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU3hNEuwvU GNCHY1TBatcUR03pNdYwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYw GAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcOAjCBuQYIKwYBBQUHAQsEgawwgakwPgYI KwYBBQUHMAqGMnJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4 YW1wbGUtdGEubWZ0MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilodHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5u ZXQvbm90aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDAwBggrBgEFBQcwBYYkcnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4 YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvMCcGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBgwFjAJBAIAATAD AwEAMAkEAgACMAMDAQAwHgYIKwYBBQUHAQgEEjAQoA4wDDAKAgEAAgUA/////zAN BgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAgZFQ0Sf3CI5Hwev61AUWHYOFniy69PuDTq+WnhDe xX5rpjSDRrs5L756KSKJcaOJ36lzO45lfOPSY9fH6x30pnipaqRA7t5rApky24jH cSUA9iRednzxhVyGjWKnfAKyNo2MYfaOAT0db1GjyLKbOADI9FowtHBUu+60ykcM Quz66XrzxtmxlrRcAnbv/HtV17qOd4my6q5yjTPR1dmYN9oR/2ChlXtGE6uQVguA rvNZ5CwiJ1TgGGTB7T8ORHwWU6dGTc0jk2rESAaikmLi1roZSNC21fckhapEit1a x8CyiVxjcVc5e0AmS1rJfL6LIfwmtive/N/eBtIM92HkBA== -----END CERTIFICATE-----¶
The CRL issued by the trust anchor.¶
-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----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-----END X509 CRL-----
¶
The CA certificate is issued by the trust anchor. This certificate grants authority over one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24) and two AS numbers (64496 and 64497).¶
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIFCjCCA/KgAwIBAgIUcyCzS10hdfG65kbRq7toQAvRDLYwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMzA5MjAxNjQ5MjhaFw0yNDA5 MTkxNjQ5MjhaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0QxMUUzRTE4NEVG QzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDc zz1qwTxC2ocw5rqp8ktm2XyYkl8riBVuqlXwfefTxsR2YFpgz9vkYUd5Az9EVEG7 6wGIyZbtmhK63eEeaqbKz2GHub467498BXeVrYysO+YuIGgCEYKznNDZ4j5aaDbo j5+4/z0Qvv6HEsxQd0f8br6lKJwgeRM6+fm7796HNPB0aqD7Zj9NRCLXjbB0DCgJ liH6rXMKR86ofgll9V2mRjesvhdKYgkGbOif9rvxVpLJ/6zdru5CE9yeuJZ59l+n YH/r6PzdJ4Q7yKrJX8qD6A60j4+biaU4MQ72KpsjhQNTTqF/HRwi0N54GDaknEwE TnJQHgLJDYqww9yKWtjjAgMBAAGjggIyMIICLjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUOs4s70+yG30R 4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUwL1SXb7SeLIW7LOjQ5XSBguZCDIwDwYD VR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggr BgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFagVKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5u ZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0Iz Nzc4NjQyLmNybDBOBggrBgEFBQcBAQRCMEAwPgYIKwYBBQUHMAKGMnJzeW5jOi8v cnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4YW1wbGUtdGEuY2VyMIG5Bggr BgEFBQcBCwSBrDCBqTA+BggrBgEFBQcwCoYycnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4YW1wbGUu bmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvZXhhbXBsZS1jYS5tZnQwNQYIKwYBBQUHMA2GKWh0dHBz Oi8vcnJkcC5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9ub3RpZmljYXRpb24ueG1sMDAGCCsGAQUFBzAF hiRyc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8wHwYIKwYBBQUH AQcBAf8EEDAOMAwEAgABMAYDBADAAAIwIQYIKwYBBQUHAQgBAf8EEjAQoA4wDDAK AgMA+/ACAwD78TANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAGgn+1s4Vbp5CIPVtDG+gSjgU kUCnUdFK8kE6cHtcwo/RGah2QBEhtUXk7U19OvEjvsGbXKhhVfGkvJV6/rxXxnTF M+D+//Ef5Lvsxbxc85UDmhT5YDaDkuS9ClSEedZsN9/4bNzOve/JYB0Xj8GnLFH8 OJo38poa5o2veqcmuwNtsAa/hAKRgDAWGD/gMsNZd83zVBgvIVasYDYXyapClD/x e3YCyWDJBJoJkFCoRB+Fb8lMAUFYx988S+BZGWA4VKGMUtPvdCtDwQak6c4PTziH /10Tc9Jxst1F0nCdmfFyMWRHNw3e5y8pmEc3WwzihGhuuOvdLzVdoEMRSwQ+/g== -----END CERTIFICATE-----¶
The CRL issued by the CA.¶
-----BEGIN X509 CRL----- MIIBrTCBlgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAzMTEwLwYDVQQDEygzQUNFMkNFRjRG QjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0IzNzc4NjQyFw0yMzA5MjAxODIzNTBaFw0y MzEwMjAxODIzNTBaoC8wLTAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQ6zizvT7IbfRHj4YTvweKXs3eG QjAKBgNVHRQEAwIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAiiqMfYMxDTKYosc77UM0 qzLuVsik3QHRMZI1YC/WVMNnuNrppjKr5e9lrfHF92XX4nO7odJk9TuCT+xpn6of /E5XQMh0btrgRO4lFS8SBqhD32++j65EWeOVHxwwiVIw0Nq9l+5kNa3a5Rfvr03d /c2DvgIUmrhQkJqUEYH0009oTsx2cFNIURhgpwdXulCcaPVO8QnKE0Vz7JwmuQJH U1vj8wB7rbW9gszbimInb1WNjR8cGL/USnDBTtoc1GSjQyhPck/UGyh5zgrmbS5R HpDVvN3FM6f8nfuz8qNy7TC8umV8IUzkJ+3+bxlUnyPUV9VNuQOQJHIgWzciA0cS XQ== -----END X509 CRL-----¶
The end-entity certificate is issued by the CA. This certificate grants signature authority for one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24). Signature authority for AS numbers is not needed for geofeed data signatures, so no AS numbers are included in the end-entity certificate.¶
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIEVjCCAz6gAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu0wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL BQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExRTNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdC Mzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMzA5MjAxNjQ5MjhaFw0yNDA3MTYxNjQ5MjhaMDMxMTAvBgNV BAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEi MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycTQrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEW yii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQgtPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0c K0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZmr5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upm BXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXhaFLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQp tmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKGzqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEog qtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMB AAGjggFgMIIBXDAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71RwUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0j BBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgeAMBgGA1Ud IAEB/wQOMAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHDgIwYQYDVR0fBFowWDBWoFSgUoZQcnN5bmM6Ly9y cGtpLmV4YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExRTNF MTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0Mi5jcmwwbAYIKwYBBQUHAQEEYDBeMFwGCCsGAQUF BzAChlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNF RjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNlcjAfBggrBgEFBQcB BwEB/wQQMA4wDAQCAAEwBgMEAMAAAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAD6JvdAdo vWT72DHKaK4Bw5Yv88g2pPHxWo+sckYyVZzr3yy29JItOHOWXv9WHcsi1mCEmqkn JMjcCaj5RuHpR3s8EWyi5qomGOsE42w8aBpqfef9rapjW/O7o1p5LDm9qh/arw8O VNU9+fnVBdbGJSVoDZScDyX+uitGeE9/dzktNeFV4bLivs/9CTXTy9eQ9RKMLkvh a5sNwNMrSS79ps9+nvFvg3Ynbkc6JGYAQgZ8K0RfQwx37Vn/AmsfvKIJWf4HzMg3 eHQp/BZbbZCbr4FEy2wQhkFqXk5F1xQj91+rlyXpdbhcvbM3SyIhiWBkinVJSA/C g1oJqaiTsNaoGw== -----END CERTIFICATE-----¶
The end-entity certificate is displayed below in detail. For brevity, the other two certificates are not.¶
0 1110: SEQUENCE {
4 830: SEQUENCE {
8 3: [0] {
10 1: INTEGER 2
: }
13 20: INTEGER
: 27 AD 39 40 83 D7 F2 B5 B9 9B 86 70 C7 75 B2 B9
: 6E E1 66 ED
35 13: SEQUENCE {
37 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
48 0: NULL
: }
50 51: SEQUENCE {
52 49: SET {
54 47: SEQUENCE {
56 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
61 40: PrintableString
: '3ACE2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642'
: }
: }
: }
103 30: SEQUENCE {
105 13: UTCTime 20/09/2023 16:49:28 GMT
120 13: UTCTime 16/07/2024 16:49:28 GMT
: }
135 51: SEQUENCE {
137 49: SET {
139 47: SEQUENCE {
141 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
146 40: PrintableString
: '914652A3BD51C144260198889F5C45ABF053A187'
: }
: }
: }
188 290: SEQUENCE {
192 13: SEQUENCE {
194 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
205 0: NULL
: }
207 271: BIT STRING, encapsulates {
212 266: SEQUENCE {
216 257: INTEGER
: 00 B2 71 34 2B 39 BF EA 07 65 B7 8B 72 A2 F0 F8
: 40 FC 31 16 CA 28 B6 4E 01 A8 F6 98 02 C0 EF 65
: B0 84 48 E9 96 FF 93 E6 92 89 65 8F F6 44 9C CE
: 57 10 82 D3 C2 57 0A FA DA 14 D0 64 22 28 C0 13
: 74 04 BD 1C 2B 4F F9 93 58 A6 25 D8 B9 A9 D3 37
: 9E F2 AC C0 CF 02 9E 84 75 D6 F0 7C A5 01 70 AE
: E6 66 AF 9C 69 85 74 6F 13 E9 B3 B8 95 4B 82 ED
: 95 D6 EA 66 05 7B 96 96 87 B2 9A E7 61 E9 65 89
: F8 60 E3 C0 F5 CE DD 18 97 05 E8 C1 AC E1 4D 5E
: 16 85 2D ED 3C CB 80 CF 7E BF D2 FE D5 C9 38 19
: BB 43 34 29 B6 66 CF 2D 8B 46 7E 9A D8 BB 8E 65
: 88 51 6A A8 FF 78 51 E2 E9 21 27 D7 77 7E 80 28
: 6C EA 4C 50 9C 73 71 16 F6 5E 54 14 4D 4C 14 B9
: 67 A0 4A 20 AA DA 0B A0 A0 01 B7 42 24 38 51 8A
: 78 2F C4 81 E6 81 75 62 DE E3 AF 5D 74 2F 6B 41
: FB 79 C3 A8 3A 72 6C 46 F9 A6 03 74 81 01 DF 8C
: EB
477 3: INTEGER 65537
: }
: }
: }
482 352: [3] {
486 348: SEQUENCE {
490 29: SEQUENCE {
492 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
497 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
499 20: OCTET STRING
: 91 46 52 A3 BD 51 C1 44 26 01 98 88 9F 5C 45 AB
: F0 53 A1 87
: }
: }
521 31: SEQUENCE {
523 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35)
528 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
530 22: SEQUENCE {
532 20: [0]
: 3A CE 2C EF 4F B2 1B 7D 11 E3 E1 84 EF C1 E2 97
: B3 77 86 42
: }
: }
: }
554 14: SEQUENCE {
556 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
561 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
564 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
566 2: BIT STRING 7 unused bits
: '1'B (bit 0)
: }
: }
570 24: SEQUENCE {
572 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32)
577 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
580 14: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
582 12: SEQUENCE {
584 10: SEQUENCE {
586 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: resourceCertificatePolicy (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 14 2)
: }
: }
: }
: }
596 97: SEQUENCE {
598 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31)
603 90: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
605 88: SEQUENCE {
607 86: SEQUENCE {
609 84: [0] {
611 82: [0] {
613 80: [6]
: 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE'
: '2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.crl'
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
695 108: SEQUENCE {
697 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: authorityInfoAccess (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 1)
707 96: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
709 94: SEQUENCE {
711 92: SEQUENCE {
713 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: caIssuers (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 2)
723 80: [6]
: 'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE'
: '2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.cer'
: }
: }
: }
: }
805 31: SEQUENCE {
807 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: ipAddrBlocks (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 7)
817 1: BOOLEAN TRUE
820 16: OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
822 14: SEQUENCE {
824 12: SEQUENCE {
826 2: OCTET STRING 00 01
830 6: SEQUENCE {
832 4: BIT STRING
: '010000000000000000000011'B
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
: }
838 13: SEQUENCE {
840 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER
: sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
851 0: NULL
: }
853 257: BIT STRING
: 0F A2 6F 74 07 68 BD 64 FB D8 31 CA 68 AE 01 C3
: 96 2F F3 C8 36 A4 F1 F1 5A 8F AC 72 46 32 55 9C
: EB DF 2C B6 F4 92 2D 38 73 96 5E FF 56 1D CB 22
: D6 60 84 9A A9 27 24 C8 DC 09 A8 F9 46 E1 E9 47
: 7B 3C 11 6C A2 E6 AA 26 18 EB 04 E3 6C 3C 68 1A
: 6A 7D E7 FD AD AA 63 5B F3 BB A3 5A 79 2C 39 BD
: AA 1F DA AF 0F 0E 54 D5 3D F9 F9 D5 05 D6 C6 25
: 25 68 0D 94 9C 0F 25 FE BA 2B 46 78 4F 7F 77 39
: 2D 35 E1 55 E1 B2 E2 BE CF FD 09 35 D3 CB D7 90
: F5 12 8C 2E 4B E1 6B 9B 0D C0 D3 2B 49 2E FD A6
: CF 7E 9E F1 6F 83 76 27 6E 47 3A 24 66 00 42 06
: 7C 2B 44 5F 43 0C 77 ED 59 FF 02 6B 1F BC A2 09
: 59 FE 07 CC C8 37 78 74 29 FC 16 5B 6D 90 9B AF
: 81 44 CB 6C 10 86 41 6A 5E 4E 45 D7 14 23 F7 5F
: AB 97 25 E9 75 B8 5C BD B3 37 4B 22 21 89 60 64
: 8A 75 49 48 0F C2 83 5A 09 A9 A8 93 B0 D6 A8 1B
: }
¶
To allow reproduction of the signature results, the end-entity private key is provided. For brevity, the other two private keys are not.¶
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEAsnE0Kzm/6gdlt4tyovD4QPwxFsootk4BqPaYAsDvZbCESOmW /5Pmkollj/ZEnM5XEILTwlcK+toU0GQiKMATdAS9HCtP+ZNYpiXYuanTN57yrMDP Ap6EddbwfKUBcK7mZq+caYV0bxPps7iVS4LtldbqZgV7lpaHsprnYellifhg48D1 zt0YlwXowazhTV4WhS3tPMuAz36/0v7VyTgZu0M0KbZmzy2LRn6a2LuOZYhRaqj/ eFHi6SEn13d+gChs6kxQnHNxFvZeVBRNTBS5Z6BKIKraC6CgAbdCJDhRingvxIHm gXVi3uOvXXQva0H7ecOoOnJsRvmmA3SBAd+M6wIDAQABAoIBAQCyB0FeMuKm8bRo 18aKjFGSPEoZi53srIz5bvUgIi92TBLez7ZnzL6Iym26oJ+5th+lCHGO/dqlhXio pI50C5Yc9TFbblb/ECOsuCuuqKFjZ8CD3GVsHozXKJeMM+/o5YZXQrORj6UnwT0z ol/JE5pIGUCIgsXX6tz9s5BP3lUAvVQHsv6+vEVKLxQ3wj/1vIL8O/CN036EV0GJ mpkwmygPjfECT9wbWo0yn3jxJb36+M/QjjUP28oNIVn/IKoPZRXnqchEbuuCJ651 IsaFSqtiThm4WZtvCH/IDq+6/dcMucmTjIRcYwW7fdHfjplllVPve9c/OmpWEQvF t3ArWUt5AoGBANs4764yHxo4mctLIE7G7l/tf9bP4KKUiYw4R4ByEocuqMC4yhmt MPCfOFLOQet71OWCkjP2L/7EKUe9yx7G5KmxAHY6jOjvcRkvGsl6lWFOsQ8p126M Y9hmGzMOjtsdhAiMmOWKzjvm4WqfMgghQe+PnjjSVkgTt+7BxpIuGBAvAoGBANBg 26FF5cDLpixOd3Za1YXsOgguwCaw3Plvi7vUZRpa/zBMELEtyOebfakkIRWNm07l nE+lAZwxm+29PTD0nqCFE91teyzjnQaLO5kkAdJiFuVV3icLOGo399FrnJbKensm FGSli+3KxQhCNIJJfgWzq4bE0ioAMjdGbYXzIYQFAoGBAM6tuDJ36KDU+hIS6wu6 O2TPSfZhF/zPo3pCWQ78/QDb+Zdw4IEiqoBA7F4NPVLg9Y/H8UTx9r/veqe7hPOo Ok7NpIzSmKTHkc5XfZ60Zn9OLFoKbaQ40a1kXoJdWEu2YROaUlAe9F6/Rog6PHYz vLE5qscRbu0XQhLkN+z7bg5bAoGBAKDsbDEb/dbqbyaAYpmwhH2sdRSkphg7Niwc DNm9qWa1J6Zw1+M87I6Q8naRREuU1IAVqqWHVLr/ROBQ6NTJ1Uc5/qFeT2XXUgkf taMKv61tuyjZK3sTmznMh0HfzUpWjEhWnCEuB+ZYVdmO52ZGw2A75RdrILL2+9Dc PvDXVubRAoGAdqXeSWoLxuzZXzl8rsaKrQsTYaXnOWaZieU1SL5vVe8nK257UDqZ E3ng2j5XPTUWli+aNGFEJGRoNtcQvO60O/sFZUhu52sqq9mWVYZNh1TB5aP8X+pV iFcZOLUvQEcN6PA+YQK5FU11rAI1M0Gm5RDnVnUl0L2xfCYxb7FzV6Y= -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----¶
Signing of "192.0.2.0/24,US,WA,Seattle," (terminated by CR and LF), yields the following detached CMS signature.¶
# RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24 # MIIGTgYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGPzCCBjsCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggRoMIIEZDCCA0ygAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu # wwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExR # TNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMzA5MTYyMTAzMjhaFw0yNDA3MTIy # MTAzMjhaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM # 0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycT # QrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEWyii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQg # tPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0cK0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZm # r5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upmBXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXha # FLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQptmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKG # zqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEogqtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQ # ft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMBAAGjggFuMIIBajAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71R # wUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkI # wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCB4AwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBg # grBgEFBQcOAjBhBgNVHR8EWjBYMFagVKBShlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZ # S5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5 # N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNybDBsBggrBgEFBQcBAQRgMF4wXAYIKwYBBQUHMAKGUHJzeW5 # jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5LzNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0 # QxMUUzRTE4NEVGQzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIuY2VyMB8GCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBAwD # jAMBAIAATAGAwQAwAACMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQAIdkoBMQydWkkaE91z # FTX6xIzzDhllfDR5bgw8C2XrAkTiWlMce+/A794a7j3+fIAyDrQ1fjgPLof6I7x # MaiqyNtb+5GqXNk+sHwjg6AnInZV2Xgz2X6lJdtNck25zGwfj/RZ8BxO+UUzP0J # UOCTAaCed2KOVF9qWfmXeZ2HPvZVD+01G0PNKdDGKzBmtWKzXsWVk00fvm+xaDs # /sBTf28O907AUM+2ipuFYfWYc2mPaT3C4uK0udl3/FhUzH6loqs/c1jIsL3mWd8 # iR2eAwBa+rsp9sc3wbnPCjFOuFZKN85nnXzrbJ6dFjqNix9Z2it7TCmU89Jltre # Rt5Q1xX+mMYIBqjCCAaYCAQOAFJFGUqO9UcFEJgGYiJ9cRavwU6GHMAsGCWCGSA # FlAwQCAaBrMBoGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzENBgsqhkiG9w0BCRABLzAcBgkqhkiG9w0BC # QUxDxcNMjMwOTE2MjEwMzI4WjAvBgkqhkiG9w0BCQQxIgQgK+LynlLxySDbBNGE # MFDMaKOPKqzlPoj7hW0EfKl9wRYwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEggEAm1SGhxyTWRb # jf+ewdePchggMKR8zY7FRy+Z5ietrNaWkF2ZgqluVmm3mRDpQDeqTYrcTcBdR3o # szs89XxWNf81Afs1mBcUdgPHxcghJNoVsDFmcPd+LEFikOtGjaFCwS2meF3RYaM # 51jKer8SObP9nqV1JdPYzaArIpzhjHUA1wktTblEmg9lEOJPqALMI9uL7ngcKaE # w4omrcNSBXt9vqge/I5wG7q9tMw2RRcYXTj1XG6nSm7bo9L4JQfBrsubaANmGO9 # NEAZeHyTQq7TzO9w7KBsB3Cg8qRhCzAY8bznt+r1DVPpQj4EHUBizYUMQRCxD5o # IUjEELzssfleF8pQ== # End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24¶